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Abstract
Brette contends that the neural coding metaphor is an invalid basis for theories of
what the brain does (Brette, 2019). Here, we argue that it is an insufficient guide for
building an artificial intelligence (AI) that learns to accomplish short- and long-term
goals in a complex, changing environment.
The goal of neuroscience is to explain how the brain enables intelligent behaviour, while
the goal of agent-based AI is to build agents that behave intelligently. Neuroscience, Brette
attests, has suffered from an exaggerated (and technically inaccurate) concern for the codes
transmitted by particular parts of the brain. In AI, on the other hand, some of the most
notable recent progress has been made not by deeply considering neural coding and its
implications, but by focusing on higher-level principles from optimization, learning, and
control.
Thanks to deep artificial networks trained via backpropagation, we now have artificial
learning systems capable of impressive exhibitions of specific human-like skills, such as object
recognition and language translation (e.g., He et al, 2016; Vaswani et al, 2017). In artificial,
rather than biological, neural networks, we can more tractably characterize the relationship
between a models neural codes, behaviour, and its external world. AI researchers have full
access to their models’ input data distribution, can visualise weights and activations in any
part of the network and even make causal interventions on them, and can quickly implement
new models informed by any coding hypotheses they may have.
Nevertheless, in-depth analysis of a models internal representations is of increasingly rare
concern for getting these models to work. Consider AlphaGo, which is one of the more
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compelling recent breakthroughs in AI (Silver et al, 2016). Researchers on this project
precisely defined the models goals, the dynamics underlying the models interactions with
its environment, how the model plans its actions, and how the model learns. Each of these
components contributes to the models success, and yet none of them fundamentally depend
on considerations from neural coding.
This is not to say that we cannot usefully apply representational analyses to such agents
post-hoc, regardless of whether the representations satisfy Brettes criteria for neural codes
(Barack et al, 2019). Indeed, since the earliest days of connectionism researchers have been
interested in the neural codes that emerge when a clearly-specified learning algorithm is
applied to a well-understood model trained to execute a particular task. A more recent and
important collaboration between AI and neuroscience revealed insight into the conditions
under which well-known codes can emerge: grid-cells can increasingly be understood as the
product of particular optimization processes (Banino et al, 2018; Cueva et al, 2018). A
key feature of these examples, however, is the central descriptive role given to the learning
algorithms, architectures, and optimization objectives; neural coding was incidental, and
in many cases the codes were not fundamental, privileged primitives on top of which the
models were built (Marblestone et al, 2016).
If the broader aim of agent-based AI (Russell et al, 2016) is to produce a system that
accomplishes short- and long-term goals in a complex, changing environment, then there
may be a more pernicious problem to the neural coding framework than it simply being
out of vogue in modern AI. How internal responses arrive from given stimuli–a goal that is
implicit in the neural coding metaphor–may be logically insufficient for producing intelligent
behaviour. In outlining the reasons why, we recall arguments that any system–artificial or
biological– needs to exert control over its environment to achieve intelligent behaviour .
First, the observations with which an agent may compute do not exist as a prespecified
dataset, independently of the agent’s actions in the world. Rather, it is precisely the decisions
that the agent takes in that world that determine the sensory data from which it learns.
Second, [w]ithout an ongoing participation and perception of the world there is no meaning
for an agent (Brooks, 1991). An agent participating in an external world that responds to
its decisions learns useful, reliable, and meaningful interactions (Cisek, 1999). It is these
meaningful interactions that ground the agents representations and allow them to be used
for understanding and reasoning about its world. Therefore, insofar as neural coding is
understood as a framework to help understand a systems internal stimulus-response patterns,
it is a logically insufficient framework for designing AI because of its failure to engage with
the agent-environment causal loop.
Given these considerations, what, then, can we say about neural codings role in describing
the brain? In neuroscience, we ultimately care about understanding how the brain enables
intelligent behaviour. It is often argued that such an understanding cannot come from
analyzing low-level, mechanistic details such as neural codes, because [a] description of neural
activity and connections is not synonymous with knowing what they are doing to cause
behavior. (Krakauer, 2017). For this level of understanding we need high-level computational
and algorithmic theories that embrace agent-environment interactions. The history of AI tells
us that the most useful principles, and the richest theoretical insights, emerged from studying
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control, optimization, and learning processes rather than the particularities of representations
or codes (Sutton, 2019). A focus on inferring such processes using our increasing quantities
of neural data, rather than characterizing neural codes for their own sake, may also be the
most productive way of making progress on understanding intelligent behaviour in humans
and animals.
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